After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist regimes, many Central and East European countries successfully managed a 'return to Europe'. For many observers, the 'return to Europe' signaled the ultimate victory of democracy and rule of law over the legacy of totalitarianism in these countries. In contrast to this optimistic view, history is not over and the rising illiberalism in Hungary as well as in some other CEE countries represents a major challenge to liberal democracy. All those who expected that a decade of 'EU accession' for CEE legal regimes would lead to an irreversible break with the totalitarian past were simply naive. They forgot that institutions of liberal democracy cannot be created overnight. It is not only that developing liberal democracy requires more time; it also depends on continuous support and endorsement by the people. The rise of illiberal authoritarianism in Hungary is reminiscent of the dramatic events in Europe's most horrible century. Even if the existence of the EU makes the danger of rising illiberalism less dramatic, there are still reasons to be worried about the authoritarian illiberal attacks on liberal democracy. As the Hungarian case shows, the EU has quite limited powers to effectively prevent the slide to authoritarianism. The irony is that conditionality, so powerful before the CEE countries joined the EU, loses much of its teeth once countries become member states of the EU. Yet, the discussion of the EU instruments to contain such slides into illiberalism has also shown that they are not totally unimportant and that they can be further improved. As I tried to argue, safeguarding democracy and the rule of law in the EU requires serious improvements in the legal toolkit currently available to deal with the slide to authoritarianism in Hungary. Ultimately, EU political actors must respect the limits of the EU political constitution and not attempt to go too far in their otherwise noble aim of protecting democracy in the EU.
won an overwhelming majority of seats in the Hungarian parliament. Shortly afterwards, with its two-thirds majority, it also adopted a new constitution.
The major problem of the new Hungarian constitution is that it constitutionalized a deeply problematic illiberal political order, directly dismantling basic checks and balances and, according to Müller, consequently leading to a Putin-style »guided democracy«. 2 Hence, the new Hungarian constitution is in a direct conflict with the 'fundamental values' of the EU "political" constitution, such as democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights (these values are protected by Article 2 TEU). 3 How well is the EU equipped, legally and politically, to defend democracy and the rule of law in its member states?
Quite paradoxically for the organization created in the wake of World War II, the EU's concern for democracy and the rule of law is of relatively recent origin. It was the anticipation of its eastward enlargement in the 1990s that prompted the EU to grant the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession constitutional status in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 4 Despite some early attempts in 1950s to bring protection of human rights within the ambit of European integration 5 , the EEC Treaty remained silent on the subject of human rights and democracy. The original deal reached at
Messina established a dual European constitutional order: the supranational economic constitution on the one hand and the intergovernmental political order on the other. 6 The hope of the founding fathers of the European project was that the economic constitution would provide for functionalist pressure for an »ever closer union«, eventually leading to a stronger political union.
With the subsequent amendments to the original Rome Treaty, the EU developed some important elements of the political constitution. 7
Nevertheless, the development of an elaborate and strong economic belonging to minorities. The same article (Article 2 TEU) declares that these enumerated values are common to the Member States »in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and man prevail.« 4 Wojciech Sadurski, Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of Article 7, E.U. Enlargement, and Jörg Haider, Columbia Journal of European Law (Summer 2010) vol. 16, no. 3, 387 5 As de Burca explains, with the failure of the European Defence Treaty in the early 1950s, the idea of a European political community and a strong protection of human rights suffered a strong setback. As a consequence, protection of human rights was deliberately removed from the agenda of the Spaak Report, which led to the drafting of the EEC Treaty. constitution has not been paralleled by an equivalent pace and depth of political integration. 8 As Weiler argues, democracy was simply not in the DNA of the European integration project. 9
As I will argue in the text, the Hungarian constitution runs afoul of several values that are expressed in Article 2. While EU constitutional law contains legal provisions for dealing with such a situation, these provisions are largely inadequate to provide for a toolkit with which to intervene effectively in the internal matters of member states. 10 Namely, Article 7 of TEU empowers the Council to determine whether »there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member state of the values referred to in Article 2«. If the Council finds the existence, not only a clear risk, of a serious and persistent breach of EU values by a member state, it can even suspend certain rights of the member state. But relying exclusively on this "nuclear option" 11 (suspension of a member state's voting rights) may not necessarily represent the best approach to dealing with such situations. A successful approach has to involve all key segments of the Hungarian society. Building democracy and the rule of law is ultimately a political process which requires a sustained involvement of civil society in the creation of basic political institutions. An approach too "punitive", as currently advocated by some Commissioners and EU parliamentarians, may even make things worse and seriously inhibit the process of democracy- 12 For example, Gordon Bajnai, former prime minister of a left-center technocrat government and now an opposition leader, expressed his concern about the too punitive approach taken by Brussels. He said that Orbán's system "can only be brought down by the Hungarian voters and not by any external influence." Financial Times, 2013. EU weighs fines for democratic breaches While the possibility to use the Article 7 TEU procedure was contemplated by the European Parliament, the European People's Party, a center-right coalition of different European parties controlling the majority of the Parliament, expressed its reluctance to take action on this ground. 13 Given the current European political situation, it is thus quite unlikely that the Council would be willing to resort to the mechanism from Article 7 TEU. Instead, the for drafting a new constitution. This provision was put in place in 1995 in order to protect the interests of minority parties. Namely, a four-fifths vote made it almost impossible to change the constitution without consulting the opposition parties. Since the amendment rule from Article 24 (3) that requires only a two-thirds majority of all MPs to change (amend) the constitution was not altered to exempt the new fourfifths rule from its purview, the Fidesz parliament was able to use its two-thirds vote to eliminate the four-fifths rule. What followed was a series of constitutional amendments that changed the rules regulating the constitutional court, the referendum process and the authority in charge of media control. The most important was the amendment which changed the rules for nominating constitutional judges so that Fidesz could use its two-thirds majority to nominate its own candidates. The second step was a restriction of the court's jurisdiction over fiscal matters. And the third step, resembling Franklin Delano Roosevelt's court packing plan, increased the number of judges from eight to fifteen and filled seven new positions with their own candidates. For the moment, the once powerful and highly respected Court disappeared from the political scene. 34 In its next move, the Fidesz government brought under its political control the Election Commission, which is important because it has the power to control referendum initiatives. The government was well aware of the importance of free media and did not hesitate to reorganize the Media Authority, the state regulatory agency, supplementing it with the Media Council, a five member »independent« body in charge of the control of »media balance«. Shortly, the new chair of the Media Authority, with a nine year term, was a former Fidesz MP, while the Media Council was filled with five Fidesz candidates. 35 Democracy, vol.23. no.3, 140. 35 Ibid 139. 36 Because of serious charges of plagiarism, Schmitt was forced to resign in 2012 and János Áder, a cofounder of Fidesz, was elected to replace Schmitt.
With "their" president in power, Fidesz no longer feared these additional checks on its executive power. As Bánkuti, Halmai and Scheppele argue, these four actions »effectively created an opening through which the Fidesz government could then push a new constitution without challenge«. 37 Then, in less than a year, the Parliament adopted a new constitution which became valid on January 1st, 2012. The new constitution, the "Szájer constitution", named after a Fidesz member of the European Parliament who headed the committee which proposed the new constitution, contains several provisions which radically undermine basic checks and balances from the old constitution. 38 The access to the Constitutional Court was radically limited so that the old system of actio popularis, allowing anyone to bring the case to the Court, is now replaced with the German model of constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde), limiting the access to the Court only to those invididuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by public authority. With lowering the retirement age for ordinary judges from 70 to 62, the government managed to remove almost all of the courts' presidents. The legislation concerning the judiciary established a new National Judicial Office with the power to replace the retiring judges and to name new judges. Unsurprisingly, Fidesz again appointed to the position of president of this body a close friend of Orbán (the wife of Szájer, the main drafter of the new constitution). 39 The President of the National Judicial Office has the unusually broad power to reassign specific cases from one court to another and, after a new constitutional amendment to the new constitution 40 , even to choose, together with the public prosecutor, which judge will hear the case. The President is elected for a nine year term. 37 Bánkuti, Halmai, Scheppele, Disabling the Constitution (n 35) 141. 38 László Sólyom, the conservative former president of both the Constitutional Court and the Republic of Hungary, publicly stated that the "Fourth Amendment" removes the last traces of the separation of powers from the Hungarian constitutional system. Under the amended constitution , no institution has the legal right to check many of the key powers of the one-party In its next step, the government weakened the independence and autonomy of other important bodies with controlling functions. The old system of four separate and independent ombudsmen was replaced with a "parliamentary commissioner for human rights" and the old data protection ombudsman was transformed into a quasi-governmental office in place of an independent institution. 41
Another striking example of using legal/constitutional tools to undermine checks and balances is the establishment of various new bodies, such as the Budget Council, the State Audit Office and the Public Prosecutor, which are currently staffed with Fidesz loyalists, but which have usually long terms of office (from 6 to 12 years) and are vested with very strong powers to veto important decisions of Parliament, to investigate the government, and to assign cases in judicial proceedings. The Fundamental Law creates the Budget Council which has the power to veto any budget adopted by parliament that even minimally increases the national debt. 42 Two of the members of the Budget Council are elected by a two-thirds vote in Parliament and one is appointed by the president. Two of the members have a six year term of office and one a twelve year term. Moreover, if Parliament does not adopt a budget by March 31 of each year, the president has the power to dissolve parliament and call new elections. Imagine then the Budget Council, controlled by Fidesz loyalists, vetoing the budget near the deadline, thus almost immediately triggering the constitutional provision allowing the president to call for new elections. The state audit office, once known for its independent expertise, is now headed by a former Fidesz MP with an unusual twelve year term of office. Interestingly, the new head has no professional auditing experience. 43 Similarly, the new public prosecutor, elected by a two-thirds parliamentary majority for a nine year term, also has increased powers such as assigning any criminal case to a court of his choosing. All these instances represent a very skillful way of entrenching Fidesz loyalists »in every corner of the state«. 44 For any future government not enjoying a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to replace the Fidesz power-holders with new candidates. Imagine then, how difficult it would be for a new government to change the course/substance of politics as it is now entrenched by the new "partisan" constitution.
And last but not least, on 11 March 2013, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the socalled "Fourth Amendment" 45 , an amalgam of various constitutional provisions seeking to limit the independence of the judiciary, 46 bringing universities under even more governmental control 47 , opening the door to political prosecution 48 , criminalizing homelessness 49 , making the recognition of religious groups dependent on their cooperation with the government 50 and weakening human rights guarantees across the board. 51 However, the most problematic are the amendments in Articles 12 and 19, which drastically limit the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, one of the last defenders of the rule of law in Hungary. The two amendments repeal all of the decisions made by the Court before 1 January 2012 (when the new Hungarian Constitution entered into force) so that they have no legal effect. As a result, all previous precedents of the Court are not allowed to be invoked in new cases based 44 ibid 145 45 The »Fourth Amendment« represents the fourth set of amendments to the Hungarian Constitution since its entry into force.in 2011. See Fourth Amendment to Hungary's Fundamental Law, Office of the Parliament, Document number T/9929, Budapest, February 2013, available at: http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/Fourth%20Amendment%20to%20the%20FL% 20-Eng%20Corrected.pdf 46 Article 13/1 of the Fourth Amendment gives the president of the National Judicial Office an exclusive power to »manage the central administratitive affairs of the courts«. 47 Article 6 of the Fourth Amendment passes financial management of the universities to the government. In combination with Article 9 (4) of the new Constitution giving the President of the Republic the power to appoint both university presidents and professors, Article 6 thus represents a direct threat to the independence of universities. 48 Article 14 of the Fourth Amendment entrenching the right of the head of the National Judicial Office to take any legal case and move it to a new court for decision. 49 Article 8 of the Fourth Amendment declares that »law or local government decree may outlaw the use of certain public space for habitation in order to preserve the public order, public safety, public health and cultural values ». 50 From now on, the Court is allowed only to review procedural validity of new amendments. As a consequence, the "Fourth Amendment" basically represents a "constitutional revenge "of the Orbán government reversing several of its "losses" Among the values protected by Article 2 we find democracy, the rule of law, human rights, freedom and protection of minorities. Article 7 defines the standard to be used when violations of Article 2 occur. When there is »a clear risk of a serious breach« of principles mentioned in Article 2 by a member state, the Council could issue appropriate recommendation to that State. This is so-called preventing mechanism described in Article 7(1) The first question is whether the Hungarian "unconstitutional constitution" represents a clear risk of a serious breach of principles from Article 2, as defined by Article 7(1). As I argued in Section Two, there is little doubt that 55 Kim Lane Scheppele, Goulash Post-Communism, NewsNet, News of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, June 2012, v.52, n.3, 3-4. the new constitutional order, particularly those provisions which systematically undermine or even remove independence of judiciary, media and other independent bodies, basically undermine the very foundations of the rule of law in Hungary. This view is shared by many other legal scholars. For example, a recent Editorial Comment in one of the most prestigious European academic journals argues that this threshold was met in the Hungarian case. 56 Sadurski, on the other hand, argues that we have a case where Hungary »blatantly and clearly« violates principles of democracy and human rights and that Article 7 presents a toolkit to deal with »precisely such occasions". 57 the totalitarian experience of mid-20th century Europe. 62 Furthermore, the CMLR Editorial argues that the Hungarian constitution, which in its preamble contains a nationalistic conception of nation, distinguishing between "real" and "other Hungarians", »sits uneasily with the model of an open and inclusive society promoted in article 2 of the TEU.« 63 Nonetheless, EU institutions have failed so far to utilize the mechanism of Article 7 TEU. When the European parliament attempted to take action against Hungary, it became apparent that the EU officials and MPs are internally divided over the priority and severity of the situation. Namely, the largest party in the European Parliament, the European People's Party, the center right bloc in the EP, opposed the proposal. It is important to add that Fidesz belongs to the same political bloc and that Orbán has many friends among the European Peoples' Party members. For example, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton adopted a clearer stance, unlike the European Parliament. As Jenne and Mude report, in December 2011, she sent a letter to Orban expressing her concern for a »crackdown« on democracy in Hungary. 64 The EP's unwillingness to use the mechanism provided in Article 7 shows how difficult it is to use this essentially »political« mechanism. Namely, in order to employ the preventing mechanism, Article 7 requires a majority of four-fifths of the Council and assent of the European Parliament. 65 The essentially political nature of the mechanism from Article 7 led some authors to argue that the use of this mechanism would be catastrophic and would undo the fabric of the Union. 68 Furthermore, since the enforcement of this article depends upon a political decision, other authors argue that such a mechanism has severe drawbacks. 69 As these authors explain, required majority voting involves "considerations of political opportunity", which might lead to a "habit of mutual indulgence", already apparent in states' unwillingness to sue each other (initiate the Article 259 TFEU procedure).
They also point to the negative experience of the Haider affair which had led to unwillingness to use this mechanism in the future. As a consequence, they argue that instead of a political approach, it might be more appropriate to use a legalistic approach in such situations ("integration through law").
However, if we look at the valid Union's law, the only available legal procedure is one provided by Article 258 TFEU. First, in January 2011, the Vice-President of the European Commission Neelie Kroes expressed her concern about the December 2010 media laws. Afterwards, Hungary The third case involves an alleged violation of the independence of judiciary caused by the provision in the Transitional Act (a supplement to the constitution with the purpose of explaining how the new constitution is to be implemented) lowering the retirement age of judges from 70 to 62 years, which, as a consequence, would lead to the retirement of 274 judges and public prosecutors in a very short time. 73 The most problematic aspect of this new rule is that those among the judges who are to retire are most of court's presidents who assign cases. Even though the new Constitution contains several other provisions which are even more problematic from the perspective of judicial independence 74 , the Commission decided to utilize very narrow legal grounds to deal with the case: it relied exclusively on Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment, which prohibits discrimination on the ground of age. 75 On the other hand, many more contentious issues affecting the independence of the judiciary were not raised in this case. In November 2012, the Court of Justice ruled that the radical lowering of the 72 EU Commission, Press release, IP/12/395, 25.4.2012: Hungary -infringements: European Commission satisfied with changes to central bank statute, but refers Hungary to the Court of Justice on the independence of the data protection authority and measures affecting the judiciary, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-395_en.htm?locale=en 73 Act CLXII of 2011 on the legal status and remuneration of judges, section 230. 74 Among the most problematic are provisons limiting the independence of the Constitutional Court and provisions giving the president of the National Judicial Office almost complete discretion to choose which judge will hear the case. 75 Editorial Comments, Hungary's new constitutional order and "European unity" (n 14) 880. retirement age for Hungarian judges constitutes unjustified discrimination on grounds of age thus violating Council Directive 2000/78/EC. 76 What is clear from these separate legal proceedings is that despite certain important legal victories, they ultimately fail to address broader institutional issues that threaten the very foundations of the rule of law and liberal democracy in Hungary. 77 Namely, the main aim of the infringement procedure is not to "target the constitutional order of a State". In other words, judicial proceedings address the issues of violations of fundamental values from Article 2 only indirectly. 78 When the EEC was founded, the assumption was that member states were "trusted to be respectful of the common values of the liberal tradition". 79 The Commission may be reluctant to act regarding other sensitive social or political matters in Hungary. Internationally, Orbán presents himself as a champion of democracy, but at home, he is implementing many questionable policies inspired by the right-wing extremist Jobbik party. For example, the Roma minority was "forced" to perform volunteer work and allow their living spaces to be inspected for orderliness in order to receive social assistance payments. 80 Furthermore, as a concession to Roma-haters, the rights of paramilitary organizations have been strengthened. 81 Hungary on certain less secure legal grounds, all three cases ultimately failed to address broader, legally more difficult to define, issues such as judicial independence. All this was due to the institutional limits of ECJ jurisdiction in this particular area. Namely, the most problematic aspects of the new Hungarian constitution are those where the Constitution does not implement EU Law. Instead, they represent, legally speaking, entirely "internal" affairs of a member state, if judged upon the rules defining the ECJ jurisdiction in this area. 85 As Article 51(1) of CFREU explicitly states, the EU protection of human 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Sadurski, Adding Bite to a Bark (n 5) 419. 85 Ibid, 419. rights from CFREU applies to the Member States "only when they are implementing Union Law". Therefore, judicial action may be useful, but only as a complement to the Article 7 TEU mechanism. There are many other controversial issues which can hardly be addressed through purely judicial means. As I mentioned above, the Orbán government implemented many questionable anti-Semitic, anti-Roma and other nationalist policies the combined effect of which is to produce an authoritarian regime. This is to say that if we treat them separately as individual judicial cases, we may see the individual trees but fail to see the entire wood, i.e., the authoritarian regime. As a consequence, they could be dealt with more effectively only by invoking the procedure of Article 7.
However, in order to make the Article 7 mechanism workable, we must first reform some of its elements. I return to this issue in the next section, where I discuss potential merits of various enforcement mechanisms available in EU law for the protection of fundamental values.
In other words, the legal actions taken so far (and political action, not taken) against Hungary illustrate "the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the self-understanding of Union's law to deal with member states' violations of core EU constitutional values. 90 Several authors 91 point to the limits of a purely legalistic approach, with its institutional constraints embedded in narrow and technical framing of broad political issues in the legalistic jargon, and, as a consequence, they defend the use of a political solution as provided in Article 7. But, with equally plausible arguments, other authors question the utility of an essentially political procedure of Article 7 and call it a "dead letter." 92 While it is clear that both camps have their points and that both approaches have their own merits and problems and that all available legal and political mechanisms should be used in the Hungarian case, I argue that a direct approach provided by the Article 7 mechanism 93 still offers a better toolkit to address the breaches of fundamental values from Article 2 TEU. As mentioned, I will return to this question in Section 4.
As forcefully argued by Bogdandy 94 , the lack of credible enforcement is not problematic only from the view of an EU citizen but it has a broader systemic connotation. If fundamental rights violations are not sanctioned, that has severe repercussions for the fundamental values of European integration, including also the principle of mutual confidence and the premise that the 90 As Iris Canor argues , the Heidelberg proposal in effect suggests that the ECJ be granted the power to protect fundamental rights from violating member states »acting within the scope of their own autonomous sovereign power«. Although this is, legally speaking, a very important question, I will not discuss it in this paper. 
The Politics of the EU Intervention: on the Limits of the

European Political Constitution
In order to make the EU intervention into Hungary's largely "domestic affairs" legitimate, Müller argues that the EU needs, apart from existing Union law, also a principled and systematic way of thinking about the legitimacy of such interventions. As he forcefully argues, they have to rely on a broader concept of the EU, which is not only an economic union but also a Müller employs here a powerful historical argument to support his claims.
He basically argues that it can be shown that post-war Europe opted, as a reaction to the political catastrophes of a mid-century Europe, for a So, the argument goes, if the EU is more than just a single market, then it is essential that it protects its distinctive model of democracy. In this sense, the values from Article 2 TEU and the procedure provided in Article 7 express 98 The concept of a militant democracy has a more specific German component. On this, see Jan Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton University Press, 2007)15-45. I would like to thank Marco Dani for making this point. 99 Müller, Contesting Democracy (n 26) 129. 100 Even though largely symphatetic towards Müller's argument, I think that it is only partially correct. The model of »constrained« democracy was not applied to the EU with the same purpose as to the nation-state. In the former case, the main aim of constraint was to limit the discretion of economic policy making without simultaneously precluding other forms of democratic policymaking at a member state level. For a similar critique of Müller, see Jan Komarek, The EU is More Than a Constraint on Populist Democracy, Verfassungsblog, 25.3.2013, available at: http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/the-eu-is-more-than-a-constraint-on-populistdemocracy/#.UX06IqO2g5s; and Perry Anderson, After the Event, New Left Review, vo.73, Jan/Feb 2012, 54. obligations of Member States "as members of the Union", as famously argued by Advocate General Poiares Maduro in the Europa case. 101 In that sense, the values and procedures from Articles 2 and 7 are more than just a political declaration left to the political discretion of the member states to decide.
Nevertheless, the political reality surrounding the use of the mechanism provided in Article 7 highlights important political limits of that mechanism.
As mentioned earlier, before the Hungarian case, it was only during the Haider affair in 2000 when the use of sanctions was contemplated by the EU political leaders. Although such moves were unprecedented in EU history, what is more interesting is that there was a strong split between the center-left and center-right parties in the European Parliament concerning the legitimacy of the Austrian government. Thus, the only way for the EU Council to adopt these measures was to bypass the Parliament and the Commission. The EU Presidency of the Council thus issued the declaration without consulting the two institutions representing the Union's interests. Another flaw of the Declaration was that the sanctions were imposed despite any explicit violation of EU rules by the Austrian coalition government. No surprise then that without using an appropriate legal basis and without support of the two key EU institutions, the sanctions were doomed to fail. In fact, they were lifted only a few months later. The same split in the equally divided EU Parliament similarly prevented the resort to Article 7 in the Hungarian case. 102
In order to redress this deeply problematic political economy of Article 7, Müller suggests some important changes of the Article 7 mechanism. As a last 101 Opinion in Case C-380/05, (2008) ECR I-349, para. 20. 102 On the other hand, the European Parliament passed the Tavares Report with a surprisingly strong vote: 370 MEP votes in favor, 248 against and 82 abstained. As Scheppele argues, the left alone couldn't account for all of those votes. See Scheppele, In Praise of the Tavares Report (n 61). resort, he proposes the expulsion of a member state from the EU. Such a sanction would apply only when "democracy is not just slowly undermined or partially dismantled, but where the entire edifice of democratic institutions is blown up or comes crashing down, so to speak." 103 As we know, EU law at the moment does not envisage expulsion of a member state. Here I agree with
Müller that the EU, as a political community, has outer and inner boundaries.
Adding the most extreme sanction, expulsion, to the existing EU toolkit helps to define more clearly the boundaries of the EU. In other words, there is no place in the EU for a country where "liberal democracy and the rule of law cease to function". 104 Furthermore, Müller suggests a system of gradated sanctions (cutting EU cohesion funds or imposing significant fines) where in the first instance, the EU Commission, upon the proposal of the Copenhagen Commission, would be able to trigger some of them without the consent of member states, but possibly in cooperation with the European Parliament. 105 The first part of the latter proposal seems reasonable, since it removes the major obstacle in the current mechanism as provided in Article 7, the need of majority in the Council to approve such measures. At the same time, the requirement that the Commission must cooperate with the EP would strongly legitimize such a move. The second part, envisioning sanctions different from those envisaged in Article 7, is also a good idea. One of the problems of the Article 7 mechanism is that leaves only a "nuclear option" to the Council, i.e. a suspension of voting rights. If other, primarily financial sanctions, are added, it is more likely that the Article 7 system will become more effective. Needless to say, an amendment of the treaty to that purpose is required in all cases. is not for the current EU to deal with situations as the one in Hungary or Romania" 107 misses the point. As we saw earlier, it is the EU Commission, which only after being advised by the Copenhagen Commission decides whether to cut the funds or impose fines on the member state in question. I find Müller's proposals highly persuasive and credible. Their major advantage is that they make the Article 7 mechanism both more realistic and effective at the same time. 122 Unfortunately, this return is very likely to be very short lived. As I mentioned earlier, the "Fourth Amendment" to the Hungarian constitution prohibits the use of Court's decisions rendered before the adoption of the new Constitution. Therefore, a precedent, the Court's essential authority in deciding cases will no longer count.
While I basically agree with the point that the EU intervention should be a last resort, the situation in Hungary clearly indicates that the situation there is far from "self-correcting". On the contrary, the Fidesz government seems to be determined to continue with the constitutional revolution. While the EU intervention so far brought some important changes in the Hungarian legislation, it is still very far from preventing Fidesz from continuing undermining the rule of law and checks and balances in the country.
The political context of the EU intervention in Hungary reveals another very important aspect of these actions. The EU and other international organization as well, are far more likely to exert pressures on a member state in cases dealing with economic and judicial issues that directly impact foreign interests. But, they are: 121 Jenne, Mudde (n 19)154. 122 Renáta Uitz, The Return of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, Verfassungsblog (2013), available at: http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/the-return-of-the-hungarian-constitutionalcourt/#.UX5IrEa2iM8 "far less confrontational over matters that undermine the internal functioning of democracy, such as curtailment of press freedoms, corruption in public administration, and the centralization of power in the hands of the ruling party-partly because of their over-riding interest in ensuring fiscal stability, but also because they have a limited mandate to intervene in political matters". 123
While we are witnessing unprecedented encroachments of the sovereignty of the member states when the EU is dealing with fiscal matters, there is a great reluctance among the EU bodies for such vigilant approach in more sensitive social or political matters. 124 The EU has adopted a series of measures (Fiscal This contrast between fiscal and social/political measures also reflects the limits of EU integration towards a stronger political union. While the spillover effect works quite strongly in the economic matters, it is far more 123 Jenne, Mudde (n 19)151. 124 Editorial Comments, Hungary's new constitutional order and "European unity" (n 14) 878. 125 Mark Dawson, Floris de Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis (2013) Modern Law Review, vol.76, Issue 5, benign when the EU tries to protect its fundamental political values. This seems like a paradox, but it is not. There are two possible explanations for this discrepancy. According to the first one, the EU is so preoccupied with the most serious crisis since its inception, the Eurozone debt crisis, that other important issues are simply overshadowed by the looming collapse of the common currency. 126 But there is also a second, more structural explanation, that such a paradox simply reveals the underlying logic of European integration showing a limited possibility for development of a strong political union in Europe. As Moravcsik forcefully argues, the crisis shows that the EU is reaching a "natural plateau" based on a pragmatic division between national policy and supranational policy: "The movement toward the "ever-closer union" of which the EU's founding fathers dreamed when they signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 will have to stop at some point; there will never be an allencompassing European federal state." 127 In a similar fashion, Weiler argues that in order to solve this crisis, the EU architects this time will not be able to rely on the decisional process of the Union itself: "It will be national parliaments, national judiciaries, national media and, yes, national governments who will involve yet a higher degree of integration". 128 This European "sonderweg" 129 will yet again affirm the "primacy of the national communities as the deepest source of legitimacy in the integration 126 Müller, Europe's Perfect Storm (n 3) 47; Rupnik, How Things Went Wrong (n 54) 137. 127 Andrew Moravcsik, Europe After the Crisis: How to Sustain a Common Currency? Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2012) vol. 91, no. 3, 68. 128 Weiler, In the Face of Crisis (n 10) 837.
process." 130 In other words, while trying to protect democracy and the rule of law within the EU, the European main political actors should respect the limits of the European political constitution. Otherwise, they risk undermining democracy and the rule of law inside the EU.
Conclusion
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist regimes, many Central and East European countries successfully managed a 'return to Europe'. For many observers, the 'return to Europe' signaled the ultimate victory of democracy and rule of law over the legacy of totalitarianism in these countries.
In contrast to this optimistic view, history is not over and the rising illiberalism in Hungary as well as in some other CEE countries represents a major challenge to liberal democracy. 131 All those who expected that a decade of 'EU accession' for CEE legal regimes would lead to an irreversible break with the totalitarian past were simply naive. They forgot that institutions of liberal democracy cannot be created overnight. It is not only that developing liberal democracy requires more time; it also depends on continuous support and endorsement by the people. The rise of illiberal authoritarianism in Hungary is reminiscent of the dramatic events in Europe's most horrible century. Even if the existence of the EU makes the danger of rising illiberalism less dramatic, there are still reasons to be worried about the authoritarian illiberal attacks on liberal democracy. As the Hungarian case shows, the EU has quite limited powers to effectively prevent the slide to authoritarianism. The irony is that conditionality, so powerful before the CEE countries joined the EU, loses much of its 130 Weiler, In the Face of Crisis (n 10) 837. 131 Müller, Safeguarding Democracy Inside the EU (n 11) 5. teeth once countries become member states of the EU. Yet, the discussion of the EU instruments to contain such slides into illiberalism has also shown that they are not totally unimportant and that they can be further improved.
As I tried to argue, safeguarding democracy and the rule of law in the EU requires serious improvements in the legal toolkit currently available to deal with the slide to authoritarianism in Hungary. Several approaches, as discussed in the article, focus too much on sanctioning of a belligerent state. Ultimately, EU political actors must respect the limits of the EU political constitution and not attempt to go too far in their otherwise noble aim of protecting democracy in the EU.
